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Abstract
Human actions are driven by the pursuit of goals, especially when achieving these
goals entails a reward. Accordingly, recent work showed that anticipating a reward
in a motor task influences the motor system, boosting motor excitability and
increasing overall readiness. Attaining a reward typically requires some mental
or physical effort. Recent neuroimaging evidence suggested that both reward
expectation and effort requirements are encoded by a partially overlapping brain
network. Moreover, reward and effort information are combined in an integrative
value signal. However, whether and how mental effort is integrated with reward
at the motor level during task preparation remains unclear. To address these
issues, we implemented a mental effort task where reward expectation and effort
requirements were manipulated. During task preparation, TMS was delivered on
the motor cortex and motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) were recorded on the right
hand muscles to probe motor excitability. The r...
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Human actions are driven by the pursuit of goals, especially when achieving these 27	  
goals entails a reward. Accordingly, recent work showed that anticipating a reward in 28	  
a motor task influences the motor system, boosting motor excitability and increasing 29	  
overall readiness. Attaining a reward typically requires some mental or physical 30	  
effort. Recent neuroimaging evidence suggested that both reward expectation and 31	  
effort requirements are encoded by a partially overlapping brain network. Moreover, 32	  
reward and effort information are combined in an integrative value signal. However, 33	  
whether and how mental effort is integrated with reward at the motor level during task 34	  
preparation remains unclear. To address these issues, we implemented a mental effort 35	  
task where reward expectation and effort requirements were manipulated. During task 36	  
preparation, TMS was delivered on the motor cortex and motor-evoked potentials 37	  
(MEPs) were recorded on the right hand muscles to probe motor excitability. The 38	  
results showed an interaction of effort and reward in modulating the motor system, 39	  
reflecting a value prediction-error signal. Crucially, this was observed in the motor 40	  
system in absence of a value-based decision or value-driven action selection. This 41	  
suggests a high-level cognitive factor such as unsigned value prediction-error can 42	  
modulate the motor system. Interestingly, effort-related motor excitability was also 43	  
modulated by individual differences in tendency to engage in (and enjoy) mental 44	  
effort, as measured by the Need for Cognition questionnaire, underlining a role of 45	  
subjective effort experience in value-driven preparation for action. 46	   	  47	   Keywords:	  value,	  prediction	  error,	  effort,	  reward,	  TMS,	  MEP	  48	  
1. Introduction	  49	  
3	  	  
	  50	  
In a complex environment, identifying actions leading to a rewarding outcome 51	  
is a core skill in adaptive behavior. The expected reward associated with the outcome 52	  
is often termed value, and encompasses both intrinsic value (primary reinforcers like 53	  
food and sex, Berridge et al., 2010), as well as learned value (secondary reinforcers 54	  
like money). Considering their evolutionary relevance, it is not surprising that value 55	  
signals are traceable in several brain regions (Haber and Knutson, 2010; Liu et al., 56	  
2011; Vickery et al., 2011). Predicting value and comparing the prediction with the 57	  
actual outcome relies on a network including subcortical dopaminergic nuclei, the 58	  
striatum, and the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC, Haber and Knutson, 2010; Liu et 59	  
al., 2011; Silvetti et al., 2011; Vassena et al., 2014a). Discrepancies between predicted 60	  
and actual rewards lead to what is called value prediction-error, which drives 61	  
decision-making as well as learning (Den Ouden et al., 2009; O'Doherty 2004; 62	  
Schultz et al., 1997; Seymour et al., 2006; Silvetti et al. 2014; Sutton and Barto, 63	  
1998). 64	  
In a natural environment, pursuing valuable outcomes often entails mental or 65	  
physical effort, which tends to be perceived as aversive and avoided if possible (Kool 66	  
et al., 2010). Recent studies showed that upcoming mental effort is encoded by a 67	  
network that partially overlaps with reward activation (Vassena et al., 2014b), in line 68	  
with several theoretical accounts of prefrontal cortex function (Holroyd and Yeung, 69	  
2012; Shenhav et al., 2013; Sterling, 2012; Verguts et al., 2015; Weston, 2012). 70	  
Moreover, reward value is discounted (decreased) by the required effort, resulting in 71	  
an integrative signal termed net-value, which embodies both task-related benefits and 72	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costs (Apps et al., 2014; Basten et al., 2010; Botvinick et al., 2009; Croxson et al., 73	  
2009; Prévost et al., 2010).	  74	  
How reward and effort expectations influence task preparation remains however 75	  
debated. Recent theories state that (net-)value influences the motor system during 76	  
action selection. Cognitive variables such as value can contribute to determining the 77	  
winning action plan in a competitive action selection process (Cisek and Kalaska, 78	  
2010). This influence might be mediated via top-down modulation of the value 79	  
network on primary motor cortex (M1). In fact, ACC and striatum are involved in 80	  
heterogeneous functions ranging from value coding and prediction-error, to motor 81	  
learning and motor control (Beckmann et al., 2009; Cools, 2011; Humphries and 82	  
Prescott, 2010; Paus, 2001; Silvetti et al., 2014). Both ACC and striatum project 83	  
(indirectly) to motor areas and might provide a suitable pathway for a value 84	  
modulation on the motor system. Hare and colleagues (2011) provided functional 85	  
evidence of the value network contributing to value translation to M1, showing 86	  
increased functional coupling between areas encoding stimulus value, ACC and M1 at 87	  
the time of choice in a decision-making task.	  88	  
This evidence suggests that value processing might be detectable by measuring 89	  
the excitability of the motor system. More precisely, the value signals computed by 90	  
the value network might influence M1 in preparation for action. Recent studies 91	  
confirmed this hypothesis by measuring the amplitude of motor-evoked potentials 92	  
(MEPs) induced by Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) of M1 to estimate	  93	  
cortico-spinal excitability (CSE) during task preparation. These studies showed that 94	  
expecting a reward modulates motor readiness and biases action selection (Klein et 95	  
al., 2012; Klein-Flügge and Bestmann, 2012). An influence of value on CSE was also 96	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reported during reward delivery (Kapogiannis et al., 2008; Thabit et al., 2011). 97	  
Finally, Gupta and Aron (2011) showed increased CSE during presentation of pictures 98	  
of food items to which participants assigned higher value.  99	  
Despite such demonstrations of value modulation on motor excitability many 100	  
questions remain open, which our study was designed to tackle. A first one is whether 101	  
changes in CSE can trace the effect of value in a cognitive task, with no value-based 102	  
decision (and related motor action) involved. We test whether value signals computed 103	  
in higher-level areas can influence the readiness of the motor system, even in absence 104	  
of action selection or planning. Second, the influence of upcoming (mental or 105	  
physical) effort requirements on the motor system was never addressed in earlier 106	  
literature. The partial neural overlap of reward and effort representations (Vassena et 107	  
al. 2014, Krebs et al. 2012) suggests that effort expectation might modulate motor 108	  
excitability as reward does. Alternatively, effort and reward signals may be computed 109	  
by different networks, and yet both exert influence on the motor system during task 110	  
preparation. Incorporating both reward and effort prospect in a single design allows 111	  
addressing a crucial third question, namely how reward and effort expectations 112	  
interact in modulating the motor system. Previous literature suggests two hypotheses. 113	  
On the one hand, effort and reward information might be integrated in motor cortex in 114	  
a net-value signal (as in other brain areas coding for value such as ACC and striatum; 115	  
Croxson et al., 2009). This would predict increased motor excitability as a function of 116	  
the net-value of the offered option, thus leading to a main effect of both reward and 117	  
effort. On the other hand, motor excitability might reflect not net-value, but a net-118	  
value prediction-error signal. Such signal would encode the discrepancy between 119	  
expected and actually obtained net-value. This hypothesis would be in line with the 120	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predictive coding framework (Friston, 2012; Friston and Kiebel, 2009; Summerfield 121	  
and Egner, 2009, Shipps et al., 2013), according to which predictive signals can also 122	  
be traced in perceptual and motor cortices. This account would predict increased 123	  
motor excitability for unexpected events, including net-value prediction-errors. 124	  
Computationally, prediction error signals allow online estimation of parameters such 125	  
as value, probability, and volatility (Alexander and Brown 2011; Silvetti et al. 2011). 126	  
Behaviorally, such signals contribute in online performance adaptation, possibly by 127	  
modulating learning rates (Bryden et al., 2011; Nassar et al., 2012). This account 128	  
would predict neither main effects of reward or effort but an interaction between the 129	  
two factors. In particular, both the best (high reward, low effort) and worst (low 130	  
reward, high effort) options should generate the largest unsigned value prediction-131	  
error.   132	  
To test these predictions, we implemented an experiment where MEPs were 133	  
recorded during task preparation while TMS was delivered to M1. During task 134	  
preparation, participants passively viewed a cue, indicating the upcoming effort and 135	  
potential reward. This allowed us to investigate the excitability of the motor system as 136	  
a function of predicted effort and reward. Additionally, to test for any modulatory 137	  
influence of individuals’ tendency to engage in and enjoy cognitively demanding 138	  
tasks, we administered the Need for Cognition questionnaire (Cacioppo et al., 1984). 	  139	   	  140	  
2. Materials and methods	  141	  
2.1 Participants	  142	  
Twenty-two healthy subjects participated in this study (age range 20-40, 143	  
average age 25). All participants were right-handed males, with no history of 144	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neurological or psychiatric disorders. The experimental protocol was approved by the 145	  
ethical committee of the Ghent University Hospital. Each participant signed an 146	  
informed consent prior to participation. 	  147	   	  148	  
2.2 Experimental procedure	  149	  
A mental effort task was implemented, adapting a previous version used for 150	  
investigating anticipation of mental effort (Vassena et al., 2014b). Visual stimuli were 151	  
introduced as cues (Figure 1b); each cue consisted of a grey circle with a 152	  
superimposed grid. The horizontal lines represented the effort level, which could be 153	  
low (lower black line) or high (higher black line). The vertical lines represented the 154	  
potential reward, which could be low (left black line) or high (right black line). Such 155	  
cues have been successfully used to convey combined reward and effort information 156	  
(Croxson et al., 2009). Moreover, despite being task-irrelevant, such cues are 157	  
correctly attended to by participants, as revealed by substantial differences in brain 158	  
activity across conditions (Croxson et al., 2009; Krebs et al., 2012; Vassena et al., 159	  
2014b). In the current study, we opted for a 2 × 2 design, with effort (easy/hard) and 160	  
reward (low/high) as factor, resulting in four possible cues (low effort/low reward, 161	  
low effort/high reward, high effort/low reward, high effort high reward). One 162	  
additional cue was used, where only the gray circle with no black lines was presented. 163	  
This cue represented the baseline condition, in which a series of letters was presented 164	  
on the screen, with the same timing as the other conditions. In this condition, 165	  
participants did not perform any task, and they were aware that the final response 166	  
would not matter. Each cue was presented 21 times, for a total of 105 trials.  Every 167	  
trial consisted of a mental calculation (except for the baseline condition trials). Each 168	  
8	  	  
calculation consisted of 5 single-digit numbers flashing on the screen (4 subsequent 169	  
operations, Figure 1a). The last digit was followed by a display showing two possible 170	  
results. Participants had to select the correct result. The incorrect result was bigger or 171	  
smaller than the correct result, with distances 1 and 2 randomly varying. The easy task 172	  
consisted of calculations with no carrying or borrowing, while in the hard task each 173	  
operation required carrying or borrowing. This manipulation has proved effective in 174	  
earlier work (Imbo et al. 2007; Vassena et al., 2014b). Reward could be 20 cents 175	  
(low) or 40 cents (high). Participants were instructed to be fast and accurate. The time 176	  
limit for responding was 1500 ms. In case of a late or wrong response, participants 177	  
would lose the same amount they were playing for (to be subtracted from their 178	  
accumulated budget). The possibility of a loss in case of wrong response was 179	  
introduced to make sure participants would stay focused on the task. Following our 180	  
previous work (Vassena et al. 2014b), and from further piloting of the current 181	  
paradigm, this is not problematic as participants typically show very high accuracy in 182	  
this task. 	  183	  
Each trial started with the cue for 500 ms. After 1500ms (stimulus onset 184	  
asynchrony) the single TMS pulse was delivered. At this time point, MEPs were 185	  
recorded. 500 ms after the pulse, a screen appeared displaying the word “READY” 186	  
and participants were asked to press the right-hand key as fast as possible within 500 187	  
ms. Afterwards, the task started.  If the response to this ready display was too slow, 188	  
they were told that the current trial would not be considered. TMS and key press 189	  
timing were based on Gupta and Aron (2011). Importantly, this key press was the 190	  
same in every trial and was unrelated to the task, as we aimed at testing CSE 191	  
modulation in absence of action selection. Crucially, pulse delivery was far apart in 192	  
9	  	  
time from the motor response to the calculation result, to avoid interference with the 193	  
final motor response. 	  194	  
Participants first underwent a training phase to get familiar with the task. This 195	  
phase consisted of a short version of the task (9 trials), with no TMS applied. Only in 196	  
this training phase, each trial was followed by two questions, asking subjects to rate 197	  
difficulty and pleasantness experienced during the trial (scale 1 to 7). 	  198	  
After the experiment, participants filled in the Need for Cognition 199	  
questionnaire, measuring individual attitudes toward cognitive effort (Cacioppo et al., 200	  
1984). The goal was to explore the potential influence of individual differences in 201	  
effort perception (Treadway et al., 2012; Westbrook et al., 2013) on CSE during task 202	  
preparation. 	  203	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  204	  
Figure 1: a. Task structure and timing. Every trial starts with one of the five 205	  
possible cues. The TMS pulse is delivered with a stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of 206	  
1500 ms from cue onset, and 500 ms before the ready display. At the ready display, 207	  
participants have to press the right key as fast as possible to start the trial, with a 208	  
maximum response time limit of 500 ms. Each presented number is followed by an 209	  
inter-number 500 ms blank. The last number before the result display is followed by a 210	  
50ms blank. b. Visual cues. c. Accuracy. The plot reports the average accuracy in 211	  
each of the four conditions (% of correct responses). The bars represent one standard 212	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error of the mean. d. Difficulty ratings given during training per each trial type. The 213	  
bars represent one standard error of the mean. e. Pleasantness ratings given during 214	  
training per each trial type. The bars represent one standard error of the mean. 	  215	   	  216	  
2.3 TMS and Electromyography	  217	  
Single-pulse TMS was delivered through a biphasic magnetic stimulator (Rapid2 218	  
Magstim, Whitland, UK) connected to a polyeruthane-coated figure-of-eight coil (5.4-219	  
cm inner diameter windings). The coil was held tangentially over the left hand motor 220	  
area, with the handle pointing backwards and forming an angle of 45° with the sagittal 221	  
plane. Electromyographical (EMG) activity was recorded with the ActiveTwo system 222	  
(BioSemi, Amsterdam, The Netherlands). Sintered 11 × 17-mm active Ag–AgCl 223	  
electrodes were placed over the right First Dorsal Interosseus muscle (FDI) in a belly–224	  
tendon arrangement. The FDI contributes to flex or abduct the index away from the 225	  
middle finger. 	  226	  
 The hot spot in the hand motor area was established by locating a stimulation 227	  
site where TMS elicited reliable motor-evoked potentials (MEP) in the FDI. This 228	  
position was marked on a closely fitting cap. TMS intensity was set at 110 % of the 229	  
resting motor threshold, i.e. the minimum intensity to induce an MEP ≥ 50 µV peak to 230	  
peak in more than 4 out of 10 trials. The average intensity (± S.D.) was 65.2 ± 8.11 % 231	  
of the maximal stimulator output. EMG signal was amplified (internal gain scaling), 232	  
digitized at 2 kHz, high-pass filtered at 3 Hz, and stored on a PC for off-line analysis. 233	  
The peak-to-peak amplitude of the MEPs was computed using Matlab. In order to 234	  
control for noise and fluctuations in the signal, EMG data were trimmed according to 235	  
three criteria. Trials were excluded when the root mean square of the background 236	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EMG signal recorded 500 ms before TMS was higher than 50 mV (1,45 %). Very 237	  
similar results were obtained when this criterion was applied to the root mean square 238	  
of the background EMG signal recorded 100 ms before TMS. Trials where the MEP 239	  
amplitude was below 50 µV (3,47 %) or more than 3 standard deviations above or 240	  
below the individual mean (1,35 %) were also excluded. 241	   	  242	  
2.4 Data analysis	  243	  
First, the behavioral data from the training phase were analyzed. Two repeated-244	  
measures analyses of variance (rANOVA) were performed on difficulty and 245	  
pleasantness ratings as dependent variables, with effort (low/high) and reward 246	  
(low/high) as factors. The goal was to test if high effort trials were perceived as more 247	  
difficult and less pleasant (Kool et al., 2010). 	  248	  
Subsequently, behavioral data from the main task were analyzed. Two 249	  
rANOVA were performed, with accuracy and reaction times to the “Ready” display 250	  
as dependent variables. Two rANOVA were also performed with accuracy and 251	  
reaction times to the calculation task as dependent variables. In all four models, the 252	  
factors were effort (low/high) and reward (low/high). 	  253	  
In the main task, the TMS-MEP data were considered next. MEP amplitudes in 254	  
the five conditions were computed. For each participant the average MEP amplitude 255	  
in the baseline was subtracted from the average MEP amplitude in each of the four 256	  
experimental conditions. The goal was to control for inter-individual variability in 257	  
MEPs. A rANOVA was performed on this data, with effort (low/high) and reward 258	  
(low/high) as factors. 	  259	  
13	  	  
Finally, a correlation was computed between NfC and effort-related CSE (high 260	  
effort – low effort), to explore the relationship between the effort-related CSE and 261	  
NfC. Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient was calculated, to control for the 262	  
possible influence of outliers.	  263	   	  264	  
3. Results 	  265	  
3.1 Behavioral data	  266	  
Ratings. Participants perceived high-effort trials as more difficult (main effect 267	  
of effort F(1,18)=22.92, p<.001, ηp2 =.56, low effort M= 2.59 ± 0.24, high effort 268	  
M=3.86 ± 0.3, see Figure 1d), confirming the effectiveness of the manipulation. No 269	  
significant effect of reward on perceived difficulty (F(1,18)=3.24, p=.089), nor effort × 270	  
reward interaction were obtained (F(1,18)=1.29, p=.27). The pleasantness ratings did 271	  
not show any significant effect (main effect of effort F(1,18)=1.455, p=.24, main effect 272	  
of reward F(1,18)=3.17, p=.092, effort × reward interaction F(1,18)=1.12, p=.30), 273	  
although showing a plausible pattern (see Figure 1e). Moreover, also earlier literature 274	  
confirms that high-effort stimuli are perceived as less pleasant (Vassena et al. 2014,  275	  
Kool et al. 2010).	  276	  
Main task, ready display. No significant effect was reported of effort or reward 277	  
on the accuracy at the “Ready” display button press (i.e. responding within the time 278	  
limit, effort F(1,18)=.25 p=.62, reward F(1,18)=.02, p=.89, interaction F(1,18)=.41, p=.53), 279	  
nor in the reaction times (effort F(1,18)=.31, p=.59, reward F(1,18)=.02, p=.88, 280	  
interaction F(1,18)=.08, p=.78). Note that the key press was identical in every trial and 281	  
unrelated to the task itself. This feature of the design was crucial to exclude action 282	  
selection effects on MEP, targeting purely cognitive preparation instead. Importantly, 283	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the reliability of such cues eliciting a motivational effect in terms of task preparation 284	  
(despite being task-irrelevant) was consistently shown in previous neuroimaging 285	  
studies (Croxson et al., 2009; Krebs et al., 2012; Vassena et al., 2014b) and in our 286	  
own results (see below). Although the possibility persists that participants did not 287	  
attend to the cues, given previous research and current results this seems unlikely.	  288	  
Main task, calculations. Accuracy in the calculation task was 81.2% (±7%). The 289	  
rANOVA showed a main effect of effort (F(1,18) =8.57, p<.01, ηp2 =.32, low effort 290	  
81%  ± 2.42, high effort 87%  ± 2.21), and no effect of reward (F(1, 18)=.199, p=.66) 291	  
nor effort × reward interaction (F(1,18)=.36, p=.56, Figure 1c). No significant effect 292	  
was reported in the reaction times (main effect of effort, F(1,18)=2.42, p=.14, main 293	  
effect of reward, F(1,18)=2.31, p =.15, effort × reward interaction, F(1,18) =.297, p=.59). 294	  
The effect of effort on accuracy confirmed that the effort manipulation was 295	  
successful. The absence of effect on reaction times could be attributed to the very 296	  
strict response time limit, making the effect of effort evident in the accuracy data 297	  
only. A further Spearman’s rank correlation analysis was performed on the accuracy 298	  
data and the difficulty ratings during the training. This analysis showed that accuracy 299	  
at the task correlated negatively with perceived difficulty (computed as difference 300	  
between difficulty ratings of high effort trials and low effort trials, r = -.53, p=.019).	  301	   	  302	  
3.2 TMS-MEP data 	  303	  
Two participants were excluded from further analyses due to technical issues 304	  
during the experiment. Two more exclusion criteria were applied to MEPs. Trials 305	  
were excluded where the final response to the calculation was incorrect (14,7%). 306	  
Cognitive processes that lead to errors differ from those in successful trials, and this 307	  
15	  	  
was not the target of the current experiment. Finally, trials were excluded where 308	  
participants did not press the key at ready display within time limit (16,4%). The 309	  
reason was that they were told that the trial would not count anymore and this might 310	  
interact with MEPs. Data from one participant were excluded because less than 10 311	  
trials per condition were left after applying these criteria. The main analysis was run 312	  
both with and without this participant, leading to similar results. For the remaining 313	  
participants, there were on average 14.4 ± 3.35 trials in the low effort/low reward 314	  
condition, 13.75 ± 3.07 trials in the low effort/high reward condition, 12.8 ± 3.21 315	  
trials in the high effort/low reward condition, and 13.4 ± 3.41 trials in the high 316	  
effort/high reward condition.	  317	  
Crucially, this MEP analysis showed a significant effort × reward interaction 318	  
(F(1,18)=6.63, p=.019, ηp2=.27). No main effect of effort (F(1,18)=1.988, p=.18, 319	  
ηp2=.099) or reward (F(1,18)=.575, p=.46, ηp2=.03) was reported. This result is shown in 320	  
Figure 2a, reporting the average MEP difference (baseline MEP per every participant 321	  
is subtracted from each condition) across participants.	  322	  
Planned comparisons (two-sided) showed significantly higher CSE for low 323	  
effort/high reward as compared to low effort/low reward (t(18)=-2.40, p=.027); the 324	  
difference between high effort/low reward condition and high effort/high reward did 325	  
not reach significance (though showing a trend, t(18)=1.46, p =.16). 326	   	  327	   	  328	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  329	  
Figure 2. a. MEP data. The plot shows the average difference in MEP signal (mV) in 330	  
the four experimental conditions with respect to the baseline condition (per every 331	  
participant, MEP to baseline cue is subtracted out to all four conditions). The bars 332	  
represent one standard error of the mean. b. Individual differences analysis. Need for 333	  
Cognition (x-axis) predicts effort-related increase in MEP (high effort – low effort). c. 334	  
MEP data in the high Need for Cognition group. d. MEP data in the low Need for 335	  
Cognition group. 	  336	   	  337	  
The significant effort × reward interaction suggests an influence of value 338	  
prediction on motor excitability, where higher CSE is recorded for the options 339	  
carrying an unsigned value prediction-error. On the one hand, the low effort / high 340	  
17	  	  
reward option carries a positive prediction-error, being the best possible available 341	  
option (receiving this cue is a positive surprise). On the other hand, the high effort / 342	  
low reward option is the worst possible option, resulting in a negative value 343	  
prediction-error (receiving this cue is a negative surprise).  344	   	  345	  
3.3 Need for Cognition analyses	  346	  
The NfC scale measures individuals’ attitudes towards engaging in mentally 347	  
demanding activities. Participants who score high on this questionnaire tend to engage 348	  
more often in cognitively effortful activities and to enjoy it (Cacioppo et al., 1984). 349	  
We found a significant negative correlation between NfC and effort-related CSE (high 350	  
effort – low effort, r=-.55, p=.015, Figure 2b). Higher NfC scores were associated 351	  
with a decrease in effort-related CSE. To test the selectivity of this effect, we 352	  
performed the same analysis on the reward-related CSE (high reward – low reward), 353	  
where no significant correlation was reported (r=-.10, p=.68). 354	  
To further characterize the relationship between effort-related CSE and NfC, 355	  
some exploratory analyses were conducted. Participants were split in two groups (low 356	  
NfC and high NfC), as in previous NfC research (Smith and Levin, 1996; Verplanken, 357	  
1993). The factor group was introduced in the previous analysis, resulting in a 358	  
rANOVA with effort, reward and NfC group as factors. Crucially, the effort × reward 359	  
interaction from the original rANOVA analysis was preserved (F(1,17)=6.25, p=.023, 360	  
ηp2=.27). The interaction effort × group was also significant (F(1,17)=17.8, p=.001, 361	  
ηp2=.51). No significant three-way interaction was reported (effort × reward × group 362	  
F(1,17)=.54, p=.47).  363	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When the rANOVA was fit for each group separately, the high NfC group 364	  
showed a main effect of effort (increased CSE for low vs high effort, F(1,9)=12.7, 365	  
p=.006, ηp2=.59, low effort M=137 ± 83.56, high effort M=-44.6 ± 69.47, Figure 2c), 366	  
a trend for the interaction (F(1,9)=3.63, p=.089, ηp2=.29), and no effect of reward 367	  
(F(1,9)=.006, p=.94). The low NfC group showed a main effect of effort in the opposite 368	  
direction (increased CSE for high vs. low effort, F(1,8)=6.26, p=.037, ηp2=.44, low 369	  
effort M=-18 ± 84.77, high effort M=57.72 ± 63.94 ), a trend for the interaction 370	  
(F(1,8)=3.58, p=.095, ηp2=.31), and no effect of reward (F(1,8)=1.25, p=.295, Figure 2d). 371	   	  372	  
4. Discussion	  373	  
The current study used TMS on M1 to investigate the influence of reward 374	  
expectation and mental effort requirements on motor excitability during task 375	  
preparation. The results revealed that motor excitability varies as a function of 376	  
unsigned value prediction-error in a cognitive task, in absence of choice or action 377	  
selection. Moreover, effort-related CSE was modulated by individual differences in 378	  
Need for Cognition.	  379	  
Traditional theories posited a serial decision process, where goals are set, the 380	  
optimal motor program identified, and transmitted to lower level motor areas (e.g., 381	  
Broadbent, 1958; Flash and Hogans, 1985, Sternberg, 1969). The assumption of a 382	  
motor time separate from decision remains explicit in current models of cognition 383	  
(e.g., Mulder et al. 2012; Ulrich et al., 2015). Here, M1 occupies the lowest level of 384	  
the hierarchy, merely translating the received programs into action. Recent accounts 385	  
postulated instead that action selection is a parallel and competitive process, where 386	  
multiple action programs are simultaneously evaluated (Cisek, 2006; Cisek and 387	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Kalaska, 2010). The selection of the winning program happens across all levels of the 388	  
hierarchy, and cognitive factors can influence this selection also at the motor level. 389	  
Supporting evidence has been provided by a few studies, showing that motor 390	  
excitability can be modulated by the value of a given action (Klein et al., 2012; Klein-391	  
Flügge and Bestmann, 2012) or urge for action during decision-making (Gupta and 392	  
Aron, 2011). Furthermore, neuroimaging studies reported an effect of value during 393	  
task preparation, with no action selection nor value-based decision required (Croxson 394	  
et al., 2009; Krebs et al., 2012; Vassena et al., 2014b). To our knowledge, the current 395	  
result is the first to demonstrate that the influence of value (prediction error) on task 396	  
preparation spreads to the motor cortex in a cognitive task, even in absence of value-397	  
based choice or action selection.	  398	  
Another key factor affecting motivated behavior is the effort entailed in 399	  
attaining a goal. The anticipation of an effortful task is associated with increased 400	  
activation of cortico-limbic regions, overlapping in striatum and ACC with reward 401	  
expectation (Krebs et al., 2012; Vassena et al., 2014b). These regions are also 402	  
implicated in value-based decision-making and value-prediction (Rangel and Hare, 403	  
2010; Rushworth et al., 2011; Vassena et al., 2014a). In fact, effort and reward are 404	  
combined in the ACC in an integrative net-value signal (Croxson et al., 2009; 405	  
Kennerley et al., 2009). In the framework of competitive action selection, this leads to 406	  
the prediction that anticipating effort might influence motor excitability as well. 407	  
Our results provide the first evidence that effort information is combined with 408	  
reward and influences motor excitability accordingly, showing a modulation of a 409	  
value-prediction signal. This emerges from the interaction effect, showing how motor 410	  
excitability is increased when the cue carries an unsigned value prediction-error. In 411	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our data, this was clearer for the low effort / high reward cue (the best possible 412	  
option), which carries a positive prediction-error (better value than expected when 413	  
considering all the possible cues; Silvetti et al., 2011) than for the high effort / low 414	  
reward cue (the worst possible option). As noted before, such prediction-errors can be 415	  
used for online value estimation. An unsigned value prediction-error that modulates 416	  
the motor system is also consistent with the predictive coding framework (Friston and 417	  
Kiebel 2009; Summerfield and Egner, 2009). This account posits cascading prediction 418	  
and prediction-error signals across higher-level cognitive and lower-level 419	  
sensorimotor areas, including the motor cortex. In our data, this value prediction-error 420	  
signal originating in the value network might affect motor excitability directly, 421	  
driving the top-down modulation on M1 for subsequent behavioral adaption. 422	  
Crucially, in our study the prediction-error signal derives from a combined evaluation 423	  
of effort and reward cues, suggesting that both effort and reward expectation are 424	  
computed and integrated. Together, they contribute to a net-value computation, whose 425	  
(unsigned) prediction-error component directly modulates motor excitability. This 426	  
may be an evolutionarily adaptive process where deviations from the expected value 427	  
boost motor excitability, speeding up action preparation to face unexpected 428	  
circumstances.  429	  
Alternatively, a brainstem arousal signal might be the mediator of the influence 430	  
of unsigned value prediction-error on motor cortex. Typically, unexpected events 431	  
(with either positive or negative valence) produce an arousal response (Aston-Jones 432	  
and Cohen 2005, Sara and Bouret 2012), mediated by noradrenalin release in the 433	  
brainstem. In our data, the increased arousal associated with the experienced 434	  
prediction-error might drive the modulation on the motor system as a potential trigger 435	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for increased required engagement. This hypothesis is in line with a previous TMS-436	  
MEP study, also showing increased CSE for highly arousing pictures (both positive 437	  
and negative, Hajcak et al. 2007). Identifying the neural mechanisms underlying the 438	  
reported modulation is interesting ground for further research.   439	  
A crucial aspect of the current result is that the modulation occurs in absence of 440	  
choice or value-related action. Klein-Flügge and Bestmann (2012) reported a 441	  
modulation of value on action-selective increase in motor excitability in a free choice 442	  
setting instead. Our result extends this finding in a context where no value-based 443	  
decision is required. In our task, only one option is presented in every trial and our 444	  
participants make no value-based decisions on the cues. The cue instead provides 445	  
information on the upcoming task, which might trigger value-driven engagement. In 446	  
fact, level of engagement can alter performance, and specifically in this task it can 447	  
lead to a final smaller or larger win. In this sense, net-value might influence 448	  
participants’ willingness to exert effort in the task. Convergently, our previous fMRI 449	  
work showed how the cues currently used induce reward- and effort-dependent 450	  
motivational effects to task performance (Vassena et al., 2014b). The intriguing 451	  
hypothesis that value drives engagement, potentially correlating with accuracy in 452	  
performance should be tested in further research. Moreover, a wider range of 453	  
difficulty levels should be included, as the current experiment was piloted to achieve 454	  
high accuracy only. One limitation of this result is that the unsigned value prediction-455	  
error effect seems to be mainly driven by the positive prediction error component. 456	  
Despite the evidence that positive prediction error signals are more reliably reported, 457	  
as compared to negative prediction error signals (Vassena et al., 2014a), future studies 458	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should also focus on testing systematically the effect of negative prediction error on 459	  
CSE. 460	  
The individual differences analysis revealed an effect of the Need for Cognition 461	  
(Cacioppo et al., 1984). People with higher NfC tend to engage more in cognitively 462	  
demanding tasks, and tend to find effortful tasks simpler (Baugh and Mason, 1986; 463	  
Dornic et al., 1991). In our data NfC correlated with effort-related CSE. The 464	  
subsequent exploratory analysis revealed that NfC interacted with effort. Although the 465	  
crucial reward × effort interaction still showed the same direction and trend-level 466	  
significance when tested in the two groups separately, the effect of effort was opposite 467	  
in the two groups. Higher effort was associated with higher CSE in low-NfC 468	  
participants, and with lower CSE in high-NfC participants. In a value prediction 469	  
framework, low-NfC people might experience increased negative prediction-error 470	  
when confronted with high effort, as they tend to avoid engaging in effortful tasks. 471	  
Moreover, when they do engage, they experience greater distress (Cacioppo et al. 472	  
1996), and negative emotional arousal has been shown to increase CSE (Oathes et al., 473	  
2008; van Loon et al., 2010). These two factors may modulate the unsigned value 474	  
prediction-error effect. Conversely, high-NfC people tend to engage more often in 475	  
cognitively demanding task, and would therefore experience high effort as a smaller 476	  
prediction error (and less arousing), as compared to low-NfC. In fact, in Figure 2c and 477	  
2d one can see that the trend-level interaction supporting the unsigned value 478	  
prediction-error interpretation is mainly driven by negative prediction error in low-479	  
NfC (where effort might be more arousing), and by positive prediction error in high-480	  
NfC (where effort might be less arousing, potentially resulting in increased sensitivity 481	  
to the reward component). One should also note that high-NfC profile only mimics 482	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the overall group level result. Of course, this splitup between groups was only posthoc 483	  
and these conclusions speculative. Moreover, the sample size in the groups was rather 484	  
small; these hypotheses need to be tested more definitely with a larger sample size in 485	  
both groups, and more extensive subjective ratings. 486	  
To sum up, our results provide support for the influence of high-level cognitive 487	  
factors on the motor system, by showing for the first time a combined influence of 488	  
reward and effort anticipation (in an unsigned value prediction-error signal) on motor 489	  
excitability during cognitive task preparation, in absence of value-based choices or 490	  
action selection. Further, effort-related motor excitability was also modulated by the 491	  
tendency of each participant to engage in effortful tasks, underlining the importance 492	  
of individual differences in motivation. 	  493	   	  494	   	  495	   	  496	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